This paper employs an empirically estimated model to study the equilibrium effects of an increase in the U.S. corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. The model pays close attention to heterogeneity of producers and households and associated differences in responses to the regulation. A distinguishing feature of the model is that it captures the fact that some firms are unconstrained by CAFE regulation, while others choose either to violate the regulation (pay a fine) or to meet the standard. By taking this heterogeneity into account, I find that the profit impacts of CAFE fall almost entirely on domestic producers. In addition, the model develops utility-consistent welfare analyses that allow direct comparison of the CAFE standard with gasoline taxes, considering the simultaneous household decision of vehicle and miles traveled. I find that increased gasoline taxes would reduce gasoline consumption for about one-sixth the welfare cost of a corresponding increment to the CAFE standard. Finally, the model accounts for the dynamic effects of CAFE on used vehicle markets -effects that turn out to be important to the welfare impacts. The consumer surplus changes in used car markets make up nearly half of the gross welfare costs of an increase in the CAFE standard. These effects fall disproportionately on low-income households. Contrary to previous findings, the overall welfare costs are regressive.
I. Introduction
Fuel economy regulation has been in force in the U.S. for nearly thirty years and its costs and impact on gasoline use have been a persistent source of policy debate. The corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards were created following the oil crisis in 1973 with one of the principal rationales being a reduction of gasoline consumption. 1 CAFE standards impose a limit on the average fuel economy of the vehicles sold by a particular firm in each year, with separate limits for passenger cars and light duty trucks. 2 Policies to reduce gasoline consumption, including increases to the stringency of the CAFE standards, remain important today as environmental and geopolitical concerns associated with gasoline use gain political prominence.
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This paper addresses two central issues: the efficacy of CAFE standards at achieving reduction in gasoline consumption and the welfare impacts of the regulation. Understanding these issues is complicated by the fact that producers react very differently to the constraints imposed by the regulation: some opt to pay the fines associated with violating the standard, for example, while others appear fully constrained. A second challenge is in examining welfare effects on households that make simultaneous decisions over vehicles and miles traveled. Finally, consideration of new car markets alone is insufficient to conduct welfare analysis, since changes in new car production necessarily have dynamic effects on used car markets through time. My model addresses these challenges and draws conclusions through three main features: 1) it allows new car producers' profit-maximizing responses to CAFE regulation to vary across firms; 2) it employs utility-consistent welfare analyses across the discrete choice of vehicle and the continuous choice of miles driven; and 3) it captures the equilibrium impacts of the CAFE standard (applied to new vehicles) on used car markets.
1 Other rationales for CAFE regulation include protectionism and addressing market failures in consumer demand for fuel economy. Portney et al. (2003) provide a discussion of the market failure rationale. Goldberg (1998) discusses protection of the domestic automobile industry. 2 Note that firms are also allowed to bank or borrow "credits" from over-compliance with the standard for up to three years and face a fine if found in violation. Section 2 provides further details of the regulation.
3 These include climate change, local air pollution, and economic vulnerability associated with dependence on imported oil.
3 than 3 percent. An examination of the gross welfare costs, however, suggests that the same reduction can be accomplished for less than one-sixth the cost by increasing gasoline taxes rather than using the CAFE instrument.
Third, I allow for interactions between used and new car markets by including used as well as new vehicles in the household demand model and in the policy simulations. The stock of used cars is allowed to vary endogenously through time, being influenced by changes in production from the increment to the CAFE standard. 9 This produces one of the more striking conclusions of the paper -that the progressivity of a CAFE standard is overturned by long run effects in the used car market. The progressive aspect of the standard is intuitive:
wealthier households tend to buy more new vehicles, and thus they bear much of the direct burden of CAFE. I find, however, that changes in used car prices and long run shifts in the composition of the used car fleet overwhelm this, making the total effect regressive. Prior studies of fuel economy regulation, for example Austin and Dinan (2005) , overlook this result since they focus exclusively on new car markets; the earlier welfare estimates correspond to losses in consumer surplus for new car buyers, which I find understate the overall welfare burden and particularly the effect on low-income households.
In addition to the elements above, the paper addresses the empirical challenge of estimating the costs of pre-existing CAFE standards. For the group of high-end European producers who are observed to pay CAFE fines I follow Goldberg's (1998) computation; my findings are therefore similar to Goldberg's for the group of European importers. In contrast, the shadow costs for the constrained domestic firms can not be directly calculated from the fine structure since they do not violate the standard. I take two empirical approaches to understanding how constrained firms respond to the regulation. The first approach incorporates my oligopoly model of producer behavior in empirically identifying the shadow costs of regulation. The second approach uses a dynamic provision in the CAFE rules to provide variation in the stringency of the standards across firms and time. I use this variation to show directly how firms adjust prices in response to the regulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CAFE regulation and provides empirical support for the three types of firms observed. Section 3 builds a model of firm behavior consistent with the observed heterogeneity. Section 4 describes the 9 I also allow changes in the fleet due to changes in vehicle scrap rates when CAFE is introduced.
estimation procedures used, first outlining the demand model and then presenting the empirical method used to recover parameter estimates in the producer model. Section 5 offers a detailed robustness check in the form of an alternative empirical model that reinforces my central model of producer behavior. Section 6 describes the numerical simulation and presents estimates of the impacts of CAFE policy. Conclusions are offered in Section 7.
CAFE Regulation and Evidence of Disparate Firm Responses
The first part of this section presents the main features of CAFE regulation. The second part provides evidence that firms have responded in very different ways to it. These differences will be critical in evaluating the effectiveness of the policy at reducing gasoline consumption and in understanding how the burden of CAFE is shared among producers.
a. Regulation
CAFE standards are enforced at the level of a manufacturer's fleet of new cars. The regulation assigns each manufacturer two separately regulated fleets, one composed of passenger cars and the second of light duty trucks. 10 The regulation defines a firm's corporate average fuel economy, for each of the two fleets, as:
where q j is the quantity of model j produced by the firm and mpg j is that model's fuel economy measured in miles per gallon. The summation is taken over all models in the fleet.
The current limit is 27.5 mpg for passenger cars and 21.6 mpg for light duty trucks.
The level of the standard has been constant for passenger cars since 1990, but has increased gradually from 20.0 mpg since 1990 for light trucks. The regulation allows the banking of "credits," defined in terms of quantity weighted deviations from the standard, for up to three 10 The regulation further subdivides the passenger car fleet into those produced more and less than 75% domestically. While this division may have had some impact initially, firms have since been able to equalize the fuel economy of the two groups of passenger cars without major structural changes (NRC, 2002) . The ease of moving cars above and below the "import" threshold and the lack of complete data on the fraction of domestic parts in each vehicle lead me to consider passenger cars as a single group. years. For example, if the firm's car fleet has a fuel economy of 28.5 mpg it accumulates credit that can be used to offset a 26.5 mpg fleet in any of the next three years.
11 Similarly, the firm may borrow against future credits, as long as it repays the debt within three years. If the firm fails to repay a debt within three years it is found in violation of the regulation and assessed a fine of $50 for each mile per gallon below the standard multiplied by the total number of vehicles in the fleet.
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The banking and borrowing scheme produces a complex set of dynamic incentives for the firm. In particular, it can be shown that a decision made in the current period can affect the firm in all future periods and conversely that a firm's regulatory compliance status in the current period can depend on the entire history. This is true in spite of the three year expiration of credits, and is demonstrated in an appendix that provides a detailed discussion of the banking and borrowing rules. The dynamic features of the regulation generate effective variation in the stringency of the standard through time. Section 5 expands on the details of this variation and provides a reduced form empirical analysis of producer pricing response.
b. Firm Response to CAFE: Three Types of Firms
I now develop a dataset and metric to divide the major automakers into three categories based on their historical responses to CAFE. 13 I first provide explanations of the groups and then propose two metrics by which firms may be divided. In contrast to Goldberg (1998), I consider not only firms that are affected by the CAFE fines, but also firms that are constrained by the regulation. I find that this new group of constrained firms bears much of the burden of policy and influences the efficiency of the regulation. Section 3 develops a theoretical model consistent with this division and Section 6 analyzes the incidence and impact of CAFE policy across groups of firms. 11 The example assumes that the overall sales of the firm are the same in the two years, since the number of credits earned is weighted by quantity. 
III.
The third, and arguably most important, category includes firms that are constrained by CAFE. These are firms that, in the absence of regulation, would choose to produce a fleet that falls below the CAFE standard, but alter their fleet such that it just meets the standard when regulation is introduced. Implicitly, this means that the cost of the penalty associated with violating the standard is larger than the forgone profits from compliance. I show below that the big three domestic auto producers, Ford, GM, and Chrysler, fall into this category.
These firms will differ from the other groups in their response to changes in the regulation, acting in accordance with a set of shadow costs related to the CAFE constraint.
Annual data on the official CAFE values for each firm are available from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and a straightforward way to see the difference between types of firms is to plot their fleet fuel economies through time. This is done in Figure 1 for one firm in each category. The behavior of Toyota and BMW is clear, with Toyota exceeding and BMW violating the standard in every year. Ford, while not meeting the standard exactly in any one year, is constrained in the sense that through time its deviations from the standard almost precisely cancel. In other words, the credits that it earns from a year when it is slightly above the standard are offset almost exactly by years when it falls below the standard. Ford's status is constrained in that it has never been found in violation of the standard, but has instead, accounting for the banking and borrowing provision, met the constraint almost exactly.
To incorporate the dynamic nature of the regulation, where credits from overcompliance may be used on a one-to-one basis to offset under-compliance, I aggregate firm deviations from the CAFE standard through time. This is done in Table 1 14 To further emphasize the differences in the three groups, the table also shows the fraction of years in which the firm had a fleet fuel economy that fell below the standard.
Notice that the firms in the violating group were below the standard in every year, while the unconstrained firms are above in almost every year. The constrained domestic firms spend some years under the standard, and some years over, using credits from the good years to offset under-compliance in the bad years.
The second panel repeats this exercise for the separately regulated light duty truck fleet. The same group of three domestic firms is in the constrained section, with the fleets of the largest truck makers, GM and Ford, again averaging less than 0.1 miles per gallon above the standard. 
Model of Producer Behavior Under CAFE Regulation
I now introduce an analytical model that shows how profit-maximizing behavior can lead to the three different types of response to the regulation demonstrated above. I assume that automobile producers act as oligopolists subject to fuel economy regulation in a market for differentiated products. Firms choose prices that maximize profits taking the set of products they offer and residual demands as given. Equilibrium is defined as the set of prices such that each firm is maximizing profits given the prices of all other firms. 16 This section lays out the analytical maximization problem for an individual firm; the equilibrium implications are considered in numerical simulations in Section 6.
Introducing CAFE regulation into the firm's profit function involves modeling the penalty for violating the standards: I assume that this penalty comes from two sources. The first is the fine levied by the NHTSA which varies with the degree of violation. The second is a fixed cost associated with the legal and political losses a firm incurs when violating CAFE regulation. I model the first of these, the cost of fine payments, using the CAFE regulation's official penalties. The function is given in equation (3) below. Since I assume that the second source of costs is fixed (conditional on violation), it does not enter the firm's marginal decisions. It may therefore vary by firm and I avoid the need to quantify its components which include damages from lawsuits, reduced credibility with the government, and loss of public image. I can not identify the magnitude of these costs directly, but it is possible to place some bounds on them: intuitively, the magnitude of the fixed costs for Ford, GM, and
Chrysler must be great enough to have kept them in compliance for the past 27 years.
Conversely, the fixed costs for firms that are regularly found in violation of the standard are, by revealed preference, such that profits are maximized when violating and paying the fines.
In the model, each firm maximizes profits net of the two types of cost associated with violating the regulation, solving:
where p j , c j , and q j are respectively the price, cost, and quantity of a particular model j made by firm i. P is the vector of prices of all cars in the market, and Q i refers to the quantities of all models manufactured by firm i. I is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the firm is in violation of the standard and 0 otherwise. H i is the fixed cost associated with violating the regulation and the functions F C and F T the fines faced for the car and truck fleets respectively. The level of the fine is contingent on fleet size and the deviation from the standard. The expressions for the fines for each of the two fleets are: Notice that the indicator for violation, I, is defined for a single year in this static version of the problem whereas the regulation allows banking or borrowing of credits for up to three years. A dynamic model, as shown in the appendix, involves optimization over all years simultaneously with a state space depending on the firm's entire history. 17 The approximation to require compliance in a single year provides a tractable model and is consistent with a dynamically optimizing firm's behavior in a period of stable demand with convex costs of compliance.
18 Equation (2) can be divided into three cases, depending on the state of the indicator I.
The first order conditions in each case are derived in Section 4, describing the estimation. In the first case, I is equal to 0 at the unconstrained optimum shown below in equation (4). The maximization problem in (2) is reduced to a standard multi-product profit maximization problem subject to the residual demand curves given by the q j 's:
In the second case, the maximum in (2) is reached when I is equal to 1. Profits are maximized when the firm is violating the standard and paying the fine. In this case, (2) reduces to:
In the third case, the maximum in (2) is reached when the firm is just complying with the standard. In other words, I is set equal to 0 but any small reduction in fuel economy would cause the firm to violate the standard. The solution to (2) for a constrained firm can be written as:
where the constraint above is the definition of I(Q i ) = 0 . For economy of notation I have omitted the case where a firm may be constrained in one fleet but not the other, although this possibility is considered in both the estimation and policy simulations.
Data and Estimation
In order to develop a consistent understanding of automobile markets in the context of CAFE regulation, models of both the demand and supply of automobiles are estimated. The first subsection below discusses the model of household demand for automobiles. The household model provides a basis for aggregate demands in the policy simulations and an estimate of the residual demand curves faced by producers. It is distinct from earlier models in the literature in that the estimation strategy provides an integrated and welfare consistent analysis of demands in three related markets: new cars, used cars, and gasoline.
The second subsection describes estimation of the producer model. I estimate the parameters of the analytical model laid out above for the three types of producers. The computations for the unconstrained and fine-paying cases follow Goldberg (1998) . The constrained case, for Ford, GM, and Chrysler, provides a new challenge in separately estimating the shadow costs of the regulation. I develop and estimate a model using the first order conditions of the profit-maximization problem above. The estimates provide a detailed understanding of producer responses to fuel economy regulation, central to examining the overall impacts of CAFE standards.
a. Household Demand System
The demand model is developed and described in detail in Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2005) ; I provide an overview of that model here. The primary data source is the 2001 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS), which provides, in addition to demographic indicators, household level survey data on automobiles owned and vehicle miles traveled (VMT). We divide the observations on automobile choice into the 10 vehicle classes, 5 age categories, and 7 manufacturers below. An annual measure of vehicle rental cost based on the change in resale value, registration, and insurance costs is constructed and given in the model below by r ij . Fuel economy and local prices of gasoline are used to compute a measure of per-mile operating cost for each household and vehicle, p ij M .
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We address two main challenges in estimating the demand for vehicles and miles driven: controlling the dimensionality of vehicle choice when households own multiple vehicles, and developing an econometric approach that simultaneously estimates utility parameters consistent with both the discrete choice of vehicle and continuous choice of miles traveled.
The first of these, the dimensionality concern, arises from the fact that many households own two or three vehicles. It would be ideal to capture the full set of interactions in these bundles. However, this is not possible while retaining the disaggregation of vehicles needed to model brand preference and a diversity of fuel economy in the choice set, so we adopt a choice occasion approach: each household makes T i separate discrete choices among the 284 available cars.
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To address the second challenge, integration of the choice of vehicle and miles driven,
we develop an econometric model that allows us to estimate the utility parameters of the two equations simultaneously. This represents an important improvement over previous work, much of which has employed a two step procedure. 21 The single set of parameter estimates, obtained by using the information in both the vehicle choice and VMT data, allows the numerical simulation of an integrated set of household decisions and consistent measurement of welfare effects under various policy scenarios.
19 p ij M also includes a measure of per-mile maintenance costs and the portion of insurance costs that vary with annual mileage.
Specifically, we model indirect utility for household i and choice occasion t conditional on the discrete choice of vehicle j as:
where y i is household i's income and p ix the price of the outside good. The utility parameters,
, and τ i are to be estimated. The random component of utility, given by µ i ! itj is drawn from the type I extreme value distribution, with the probability of a given discrete choice j maximizing utility therefore taking the logit form:
The second equation, for the continuous choice, is derived directly from the indirect utility function in (7) using Roy's identity, and is given by:
where M itj is miles driven for household i conditional on choosing vehicle j. We assume M itj is measured imperfectly, yielding the second estimation equation,
where ! M itj is the observed survey response on miles driven and ! itj is i.i.d. Gaussian error.
To compute the estimates, we adopt a Bayesian approach and use a variation of Allenby and Lenk's (1994) implementation of the Gibbs sampler. Mean values for the elasticities of miles driven with respect to operation cost and income, respectively, are found to be -0.69 and 0.62, with the related elasticity of demand for gasoline estimated to be -0.32.
The mean elasticity of new vehicle demand with respect to price is estimated to be -2.0. The estimated utility parameters are allowed to vary by household income, family composition, education, MSA size, and race. These sources of variation allow a particularly detailed view of the distributional effects of policy.
b. Producer Costs
In addition to estimating the demand system, I also estimate the supply side, that is, the cost parameters that determine producer responses to CAFE regulation. In order to recover the cost parameters I make use of the firms' first order conditions, corresponding directly to the model of behavior above. Where the residual demand functions enter I incorporate estimates from the household demand system. We will see that an estimate of costs may be computed directly, along the lines of Goldberg (1998) , for two of the three groups of firms: those that are unconstrained or that are paying the fine. For the third class, the constrained domestic firms, I introduce an econometric model to separate two components of cost under a pre-existing CAFE standard: marginal production cost, and the shadow cost of existing regulation.
i. Computation for Unconstrained and Fine-Paying Firms
First consider the case of the unconstrained firm given in (4). This is a standard multiproduct profit maximization problem and the set of first order conditions with respect to price may be written in matrix notation as:
where Q i is the vector of quantities of each type of vehicle made by firm i, and P i and C i the corresponding price and cost vectors. D i is the j by j matrix of derivatives of demand where the k, ! th element of D i is: !q ! !p k . I compute the matrix D i from the aggregate household demand system described in Section 4a, and the vectors Q i and P i are available as data. An estimate of costs may then be computed directly from (10).
In the second case, which describes firms observed to be violating the standard and paying the fine, the first order conditions may be written as:
where ! F iC and ! F iT are vectors with the elements defined as the per-vehicle fine for each car and light duty truck. The vectors G iC and G iT are the derivatives of ! F iC and ! F iT with respect to vehicle price. 22 As mentioned, this calculation and the one above for unconstrained firms so far follow the analysis done in Goldberg (1998) , with the exception that I model the average fuel economy calculation using the regulation's harmonic mean formula rather than a linear average. The result is that the derivatives in G iC and G iT are no longer linear, but are
given by:
Despite the complexity of this expression, an estimate of C i may still be computed directly from the data as in the unconstrained case.
ii. Estimation Procedure for Constrained Firms
The largest domestic automakers fall into neither of the two categories described by
Goldberg, but instead are constrained by CAFE. The shadow cost of satisfying the regulation is unobserved and must be identified separately from production cost in order to understand the impacts of policy.
For clarity, first rewrite the maximization problem given in (6) in vector notation:
where the k-th element of M iC is 1 ! 27.5
for passenger cars and 0 otherwise. The k-th
for light duty trucks and 0 otherwise. We can write the first order condition with respect to price of the associated Lagrangian as:
where ! iC and ! iT are the scalar Lagrange multipliers for firm i associated with the passenger car and light duty truck constraints, respectively. In the previous two cases we saw that an estimate of C i could be computed directly from the first order conditions. This is no longer possible since the terms representing the shadow cost of CAFE are also unknown. The remainder of this section describes an econometric approach for estimating ! iC and ! iT , from which the remaining parameters needed for the policy simulations may be computed.
Notice that, at the optimum, ! iC (and similarly ! iT ) takes the same value across all models produced by a given manufacturer. This restriction, that the shadow cost of the regulation is made equal across products, will be used in identifying the econometric model.
Intuitively, it states that at the optimum firms set the shadow cost of the constraints, given by the λ terms, equal across models.
A proxy for the price-cost margin is also introduced, constructed using the dealer markups observed in the data and the ratio of dealer to manufacturer margin suggested in Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) . They find that this ratio is approximately constant across vehicles -that is, that while markups will differ widely based on attributes of the vehicle and the corresponding demand elasticities, the fraction of the total markup kept by the dealer is roughly constant. I assume that this measure, B i , includes error and a constant factor, and consider the following two forms:
In specification (I) ! i is an additive constant and ε is measurement error independent of the variables entering the producer's optimization problem. Specification (II) adds a multiplicative term, ! i , and is preferred since the multiplicative factor is in keeping with the Bresnahan and Reiss model. I show that the central parameter estimates of the model are robust across both specifications, but find that model (II), including the multiplicative constant, fits the data more closely.
Rearranging the first order condition in (14), we can write the price-cost margin, P i ! C i , in terms of the demand system and the shadow costs of CAFE:
Combining this with the functional forms considered for B i yields the following models:
The unknown parameters, ! iC , ! iT , ! i and, in the case of model (II), ! i , are estimated by least squares. The results are presented in Table 2 . Each model is estimated first using a scalar value for the constant term(s), and then allowing the constant to vary with vehicle make and fleet. 23 While the models are both identified in cross-section, data for the years 1997-2001 is pooled due to the limited number of observations available for a single year. Implicitly, this adds the assumption of a constant shadow cost of CAFE across these five years. Recall, however, that firms may shift the CAFE requirements across time, so that in a period of stable demand it is not unreasonable to assume that they are able to equalize the shadow costs.
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The estimates for ! iC and ! iT shown in Table 2 are reasonably robust across the various specifications. I also find that they vary significantly among manufacturers. To attach economic meaning to the parameters and the differences observed among firms, I
compute the marginal effects of a unit change (one mile per gallon) in the standard on the profits of each firm and fleet in Table 3 . 25 In this table, and as the central case in the policy simulations, the values from model (IIb) are used.
The highest shadow costs displayed in Table 3 are for GM's passenger car fleet.
Intuitively, this fleet is estimated to be the most constrained in the sense that the pricing of the component vehicle models reflects the largest distortions attributable to regulation. At the other end of the spectrum, Ford's car fleet shows the smallest effects from CAFE. These estimates are consistent with casual observation in the domestic auto industry: among 23 In further robustness checks, I also allow the constants to vary with year. This produces only very slight changes from the model with make and fleet effects so is not presented. 24 The seven-year limit on the window of banking and borrowing and long run changes in market conditions may mean that firms either can not or do not wish to equalize shadow costs over long time horizons. In order to limit the impact of these long run effects, I restrict the time period for estimation to the five years leading up to 2001 -the year from which the cross-section of household demand data is drawn. 25 The marginal effects are derived by inverting the (nonlinear) transformation performed on the constraint when writing it in the form of equation (13), and converting to dollar units.
carmakers, Ford has a reputation for its "practical" car line (Taurus, Escort, Focus) whereas GM is best known for a lineup of larger, high-horsepower vehicles with correspondingly low fuel economy. In truck fleets, Ford and GM are similar, while Chrysler, with its dominance in the minivan market, has the lowest marginal costs of CAFE. (Minivans have significantly better fuel economy than most SUVs.)
Time Series Model of Prices
The analytical model and parameter estimates above are based on the assumption that firms react to CAFE by changing prices, thereby affecting demand and the composition of their fleet. An alternative estimation procedure is possible, however, from which we can learn about firm pricing behavior without this assumption. I present it here as a check on the estimates and as a way to add support to the assumptions I make above about pricing decisions.
This estimation strategy uses a firm's history of compliance, and therefore information about how many extra credits it has or obligations it owes, to derive a proxy for how constrained it is in any given year. Price is regressed on the information about CAFE status to assess how firms alter prices based on the regulation. I will show that while this model makes a very different set of assumptions and uses different data sources, it results in a set of estimates consistent with the results presented above in Section 4b.
Recall that the regulation allows the banking of credits from three prior years, or the borrowing against three years into the future. If the firm holds credits longer than three years they expire, and if it fails to repay borrowed credits within three years the firm is found in violation. The first simple measure of annual "firm state" I construct is simply the number of credits a firm has that will expire if they go unused minus the number of borrowed credits it must repay to avoid penalty. A positive value then means that a firm may freely produce a fleet that is less than the standard, so that the firm is less constrained by the regulation. A negative value means that a firm must exceed the standard in order to avoid a penalty for not paying back borrowed credits, and is therefore more constrained by the regulation.
I construct this measure from my dataset as follows. Define the variables:
! 0,t " Credits (debts) expiring (due) in year t ! 1,t " Credits (debts) in year t, expiring (due) in year (t + 1) ! 2,t " Credits (debts) in year t, expiring (due) in year (t + 2)
where d t is the standard and CAFE t is the firm's certified fleet fuel economy in year t.
Positive values of δ indicate credits and negative values indicate debts. I compute the evolution of the δ parameters through time from the initial state (! 0,0 = 0 , ! 1,0 = 0 , and ! 2,0 = 0 ) and the complete time series data on Y t beginning with the 1978 inception of CAFE.
For example, in the case that the firm has credits available (so at least one δ t is positive) and uses some of them (so Y t is negative) the state variables in the next year (δ t+1 ) are defined as:
An analogous set of rules applies for computing the stock and flow of debts through time and for the remaining cases on Y t . These are provided in the appendix. In the notation then, my first measure of the firm's state is given simply by ! 0i,t " ! 0,t for firm i. I wish to know the effect of this state on relative prices, therefore I estimate:
where the left hand side is the log of price of a particular car class for each firm i and year t.
The model is estimated separately for each car class. The first terms on the right hand side are fixed effects for year and firm, α t and α i . Next is a matrix of vehicle characteristics X it , with estimated coefficients γ.
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! i is the coefficient on the measure of a firm's credits or debts, and is the parameter of interest. It indicates how firm prices are related to CAFE state, after controlling for car characteristics and make and year fixed effects. Finally, ! captures unobserved heterogeneity in vehicles and is assumed to be uncorrelated with ! 0i,t .
A second specification relaxes the assumption that firms only consider credits or debts expiring in the current period, and instead uses a measure based on optimal behavior given the expiration dates for all three vintages of credits or debts it may possess. I again assume convexity of compliance costs, causing the firm to repay a debt evenly over three years, or, analogously, to use a credit evenly over its three year life. 27 This measure of aggregate firm state (as its optimal deviation from the constraint) is then given by:
in the case that a firm has credits. For the case of debts, the sign of S t and the inequalities are reversed. Intuitively, S t simply spreads the use of credits or debts evenly over three years, with the nonlinearities arising because of the constraints imposed by the expiration dates.
Model (II) replaces the firm state in (18) with this aggregate measure:
The results from estimating models (I) and (II) are presented in Table 4 . The point estimates are the change in vehicle price (for the class given in the column heading) in years when a firm has an extra one-mile-per-gallon credit that it may use. For example, the top left estimate indicates that, controlling for make and year fixed effects and car characteristics, Ford prices compact cars 4.5% higher in years when it can freely deviate one mile per gallon below the standard.
The pattern of estimates across vehicle classes presented in Table 4 strongly supports the model of firm behavior in Section 4b: the latter model asserts that vehicles with high fuel economy have a negative shadow cost from regulation, and should therefore be priced higher in years when the regulation is less binding. The positive coefficients in the first column of Table 4 bear this out. Similarly, vehicles with the lowest fuel economy (in the right-most column of Table 4 ) should have the highest shadow costs, and thus the lowest prices in years when regulation is less binding. This is also supported. Finally, the price of midsize vehicles is found to be relatively unaffected by the stringency of regulation, which again fits the behavioral model since midsize fuel economies tend to be close to the mean and therefore have near zero shadow costs associated with regulation. The estimates in Section 4b, on the other hand, base the shadow costs and implicit pricing effects on relative fuel economy and demand elasticities. They can therefore capture the effects as the truck market changes over time. Furthermore, since the full model of firm behavior also incorporates information from cross-sectional variation, I am able to use the shorter time period beginning in 1997 after much of the rearrangement in the truck market is complete.
Simulation Model and Results
The simulation model combines household and producer decisions in the automobile market, using the parameter estimates in Section 4 to calibrate the consumer and producer optimization problems. Equilibrium in car markets is solved numerically at 1 year intervals for 10 years. The results capture the effects of CAFE standards on both new and used car markets as the fleet turns over. The model is solved sequentially, with agents optimizing in each period according to the household utility function and producer problem described above. 29 The quantities and attributes of vehicles available in the used car market are updated through time, and evolve according to the full history of demands.
a. Structure of Numerical Model

Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand for new and used cars comes from maximizing the household utility function described in equations (7) and (9). Households simultaneously make the discrete choice of vehicle and the continuous choice of miles. Since the estimated utility parameters in (7) and (9) vary with household characteristics, the 20,429 households in the dataset are considered individually. The resulting household level demands are combined to arrive at an aggregate demand for each of the 284 discrete vehicles. 30 Note that 225 of the vehicles comprise demands in the used car market, with 59 in the brand-differentiated new car market. Aggregate demand for miles driven, and therefore gasoline, is calculated directly from the solutions to the household utility maximization problems.
Supply of New Cars
The supply of new cars is computed by solving the producer problem given in equation (2) for each of the seven firms considered. This requires the use of the cost estimates described in Section 4b, and the derivatives of the automobile demand function, D i .
Numerically, the simulation addresses the special cases in (2) by solving the first order conditions given in (4), (5), and (6), for each of the three cases, and finding the maximum where all conditions are satisfied. 31 This solution procedure must be iterated to find an equilibrium, since the solution for any one firm depends on the prices set by all of the others.
Supply of Used Cars
The supply of used cars available of a particular class, make, and age category depends on the stock (given by historical demand for new cars) and the rate at which vehicles of that type are scrapped. At any given time t it is calculated by adding the previous period's production of new cars to the previous supply of used cars, and deducting the number of vehicles which are scrapped. Specifically:
where q !,t U and q !,t N are the quantity of used and new cars of make and class ! available in year t, and ! ! represents the average probability that used cars of type ! are scrapped. The expression above is a slight simplification of the model, in that it actually contains four different age categories of used vehicles. The computation is performed separately for the transitions between each of the different age categories.
The probability that a car is scrapped in any given year is determined endogenously.
It is specified as a probability since each discrete vehicle of the 284 considered includes a large number of vehicle of varying condition. The lowest value cars of each type will be scrapped, and the total number scrapped will depend on the resale value of the vehicle if maintained in working condition. Higher resale value implies lower scrap rates, captured simply in the model as:
31 The simulated producer problem is subject to the restriction that constrained firms have a sufficiently high value for H that they do not choose to violate the standard.
where b j is a scale parameter used for calibration and ! j is the elasticity controlling the change in scrap probability as the price of the car changes. Baseline scrap rates increase with car age.
Equilibrium
The solution to the numerical model is a set of new car prices, used car prices, and transfers to the household that simultaneously clear the used car market, solve the producers' problems subject to CAFE, and balance the government budget. Supply in the used car market adjusts according to the elasticity given in (20), with aggregate demand derived from the solution to the households utility maximization problems. The solution to the second condition, equilibrium in the oligopoly problem faced by producers, is a set of new car prices that maximizes profits for each firm conditional on the decisions of the others. The model solves for the new car market equilibrium, holding used car prices fixed, and then solves the used car market. Because of the interdependence of demands in the two markets, this procedure is iterated to convergence.
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The third condition, balance of the government budget, is reached by adjusting the level of the transfer to the household. In the simulation, the government receives revenue from pre-existing gasoline taxes and from the fines levied on violators of the CAFE standard.
It returns the revenue in a flat lump-sum payment to households. Revenue changes resulting from the CAFE standard are typically fairly small (the increase in fines and the decrease in gasoline tax revenue act in opposite directions) so that relatively little adjustment is needed in the payments. 33 The solution to the system is found using Broyden's method, a derivativebased quasi-Newton search algorithm.
b. Simulation Results
My central policy simulation involves an increment of one mile per gallon to the CAFE standard. I divide the numerical results from this simulation into three parts. First, I
present the effects of the policy on equilibrium gasoline consumption and welfare, with the latter broken down into effects on consumer and producer surplus. Second, I compare the effects of the policy on fuel economy and profits across the different producers. Third, I
evaluate the distribution of welfare effects across household income groups.
I also perform a set of simulations that allows comparison of the gasoline tax with the CAFE standard. The utility consistent welfare analysis allows me to measure the efficiency improvements of a gasoline tax relative to the CAFE standard. I also present an extension that allows for endogenous technological improvements in fuel efficiency in response to the CAFE standard.
Overall Change in Gasoline Consumption and Welfare
The first panel of Table 5 displays the change in gasoline use and fuel economy from a one mile per gallon increase in the CAFE standard. Notice that gasoline use declines in the first year by only 0.8 percent since the standard has not yet had time to affect used cars. By year 10, however, gasoline use has declined 3.4 percent from the baseline. The gradual effect of the standard on the used car fleet can be seen in the decomposition of fuel economy improvements among new and used cars. Interestingly, the used fleet will never fully reflect improvements in new car fleet fuel economy due to changing scrap rates. This is because higher prices for large vehicles, induced by their relative shortage under CAFE, result in lower scrap rates over time. This creates a used car fleet weighted more heavily toward large vehicles, and with a correspondingly low average fuel economy relative to new cars.
The second panel of Table 5 displays the overall welfare effect and decomposes it into changes in consumer and producer surplus. 34 Notice first that the welfare loss rises through time, which reflects the increasing incidence of the policy on used car markets in the later years. Intuitively, much of the welfare loss comes from the shift in composition of the vehicle fleet toward small vehicles: in the early years households with a strong preference for large vehicles can shift demand to the used markets and so suffer smaller welfare losses. Over time, however, the number of large vehicles in the used market is also diminished, resulting in the increasing pattern of welfare losses.
This point also appears clearly in the decomposition of welfare effects into producer and consumer surplus. Loss in producer surplus remains relatively stable over time, declining slightly as competition from large vehicles in the used market declines. Loss in consumer surplus, however, rises sharply over time as the effects of CAFE standards enter the used car market. Table 6 shows the equilibrium effects on the seven simulated producers and displays stark contrasts between producers of different types. First consider the effects on fuel economy: the constrained domestic firms comply with the simulated policy and increase fuel economy by one mile per gallon. The foreign producers, however, actually reduce average fuel economy in response to the increased stringency. This reaction is of interest as it points to an important source of inefficiency that is captured only in a model with heterogeneous firms. Intuitively, CAFE standards cause the constrained domestic makers to sell a more fuel efficient -lighter or less powerful -mix of vehicles. 35 This moves the residual demand curves for vehicles with high weight and horsepower to the right for all other producers.
Distribution of Incidence among Producers
Consider the effect of this demand shift on unconstrained firms: they can freely substitute into a less fuel efficient fleet, up to the amount of slack in the standard, taking over the demand for larger vehicles. 36 The effect on the fine-paying European producers can be divided into two competing components: the first effect is the increased marginal cost of the fine, which acts as an incentive to improve fleet fuel economy. The second is the outward movement of residual demand for large vehicles, which acts in the opposite direction. Table 6 shows that this latter effect dominates: the violating European producers, like the unconstrained firms, move in the direction of a less fuel efficient fleet.
The distribution of incidence among firms appears at the bottom of Table 6 : The constrained domestic producers suffer equilibrium profit losses ranging from 4 to 21 percent, 35 Reductions in engine size are captured as shifts from luxury to non-luxury models. Reductions in weight and wheelbase appear as shifts toward midsize or compact vehicles. 36 The slack in the standard is about 4 miles per gallon for Honda and Toyota in 2001. while the foreign producers are actually able to increase profits. The profit increases are realized by taking advantage of the increased demand for large and luxury vehicles, with
Honda posting the largest gain of nearly 3 percent. While the simulation model does not specifically distinguish car lines, the evidence suggests that Honda's luxury Acura line would be responsible for the majority of its gains.
Distribution of Welfare Effects across Income Groups
Finally, I show the distribution of welfare effects across households by income group.
My analysis is well suited to addressing the debate over the progressivity of CAFE standards since it fully models interactions with the used car market. I show that low-income consumers, who tend to purchase used vehicles, are affected significantly by CAFE and that this effect varies importantly over time.
The second column of Table 7 displays the total welfare loss as a percentage of income, with the top and bottom panels respectively representing the first and tenth year of the simulation. In year 1, the welfare loss is similar in proportion across income groups due to the larger absolute impact of distortions in new car markets on wealthy households. 37 This is an argument that is commonly made to support progressivity of CAFE standards, and I confirm that in the first year of regulation it works as expected. In contrast, the welfare effects in the tenth year become sharply regressive, with low-income households suffering welfare losses (as a fraction of income) more than three times as large as those of the highincome group. This result has been overlooked in prior studies since it appears only when considering longer run effects of CAFE in used car markets. The intuition is simply that CAFE will, over time, drive up the price of used vehicles and shift the composition of the used vehicle fleet toward smaller vehicles. Given the strong preferences for large vehicles estimated using the household data, the welfare effects in the used market rapidly become important.
37 Producers are assumed to be owned by the households in proportion to income --meaning a loss in profits affects high-income households more than low-income households. High income households also buy a larger share of new vehicles, meaning loss in consumer surplus is similarly distributed. Taxes   Table 8 The costs per gallon of gasoline saved under CAFE are considerably lower as a result of this extension, but remain more than twice as large as those of the gasoline tax.
Comparison of the CAFE Standard and Gasoline
Finally, the bottom row of Table 8 indicates the fraction of the welfare loss borne by producers. It is generally higher in the case of CAFE, as can be expected given that fuel economy regulation constrains firm decisions directly. In the case of endogenous technological change, however, the cost borne by firms falls considerably. This is in accordance with the cost estimates made by the NRC (2002), which allow relatively inexpensive improvements in fuel economy.
Conclusions
I have developed a new approach to studying the effects of CAFE standards, allowing heterogeneous firm response and considering equilibrium impacts in the interrelated new and Second, I find that heterogeneity among firms causes the profit impacts of an increment in CAFE to fall almost exclusively on domestic firms. I also find that equilibrium responses, driven by firm heterogeneity, are responsible for the relatively small effects of the policy on final gasoline consumption. The policy impacts are divided along the lines I established in Section 2. Ford, GM, and Chrysler were shown to be constrained by the regulation: when the stringency of the standard is increased they alter prices to remain in compliance and bear substantial losses in profit. The group of firms who are unconstrained by the standard, which includes Honda and Toyota, are able to increase profits 3 percent by increasing their market share in classes of vehicles that are larger, heavier, or more powerful.
A set of competing effects enters for the group of high-end European firms that pay fines for violation. These are discussed in more detail above, but I find that they, too, experience slight increases in profit by taking advantage of increased residual demand for low fuel economy vehicles.
Third, I conclude that the long run effects of increments in fuel economy standards are not progressively distributed among income groups as might be expected. A common argument maintains that since CAFE affects new car producers, it will have a greater impact on wealthier households who purchase a disproportionate share of new vehicles. By including used car markets and simulating effects through time, however, I find that increased prices and changes in fleet composition for used cars lead to substantial welfare losses for low income households. Specifically, in the tenth year of the policy low income households bear about three times more burden, relative to income, than the wealthiest group.
Taken together, the findings suggest that a gasoline tax is preferred to a simple increment in CAFE standards on both efficiency and distributional grounds: I find that increasing the stringency of CAFE will be much more costly relative to the amount of gasoline conserved and will fall disproportionately on domestic firms and low-income households. This remains the case in an extension allowing for endogenous technological improvements in fuel efficiency. If, however, fuel economy standards continue to be a politically attractive policy to address the externalities associated with gasoline consumption, my model can be used to inform improvements in their design. For example, consideration of firm heterogeneity suggests that incentives should be provided across all firms in order to prevent the market for less efficient vehicles from shifting to less constrained manufacturers.
A number of important caveats in the model and points for future research remain.
Principle among them is consideration of induced technological change prompted by fuel economy regulation. Firm heterogeneity, along the lines described in this paper, may potentially be used to identify differences in incentives to develop fuel efficiency enhancing technology. A deeper understanding of the demand-side tradeoffs between fuel economy and vehicle attributes like weight and horsepower is also essential in approaching this issue. My findings here provide a starting point for this ongoing research and present a base of empirical conclusions about firm behavior and efficiency costs under CAFE regulation.
Appendix: Dynamics of Banking and Borrowing in U.S. CAFE regulation
This appendix provides an analysis of the dynamic decisions made by firms in the context of CAFE regulation and provides support for the simplified static model used in the main text.
Banking and borrowing rules
Under the rules established for the CAFE program, a set of certified fleet fuel economies is produced for each firm on an annual basis. Deviations from the standard are first used to offset the firm's stock of credits or debts, beginning with the oldest. When no existing credits or debts remain, deviations from the standard are "banked" for three years into the future. If a firm has debts owed from three years in the past and has failed to repay them, the firm is found to be in violation and a fine is assessed in the amount of $50 per vehicle per mile per gallon. Notice that no violation occurs and no penalties are assessed if the firm repays its debts within three years.
The following example illustrates the accounting method used: the "deviation" in year t, Y t , takes a positive value if the firm has a fleet fuel economy above the standard, and a negative value if it is below. The values for ! take a positive value if the firm has credits which it may use to offset a negative deviation, and a negative value if it has debts it must repay. The three subscripts on ! distinguish credits or debts according to years remaining until expiry: ! 0 , for example, indicates credits or debts that expire in the current year. The example considers ten years, starting with the inception of the regulation when the firm has no credits or debts:
Deviation from standard Credits (+) or debts (-) Fine payment if violation
In the first year of the regulation, the firm's fleet is 2 miles per gallon below the standard, and so it carries a debt into the second year. This is indicated by ! 2 = "2 in row 2. It complies exactly in the second year, and so the debt continues into year three, now indicated by ! 1 = "2 . The firm's fleet is 3 miles per gallon over the standard in year 3, so it repays the debt and accumulates a credit of 1 mile per gallon to be used in the future. The values of ! are computed in this way through year 10. Notice that in year 9 the firm has an expiring debt that it fails to repay, and so it is fined $50 per vehicle.
A-2
An interesting feature of this accounting system is that a firm's action has the potential to affect violation in any future year, not just three years into the future. For example, if the firm had deviated by -1 instead of -2 miles per gallon in the first year of regulation, it could have avoided violation altogether in the 9th year. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive, since one might expect the three year limit on banking and borrowing to limit the dependence of current violations on actions long in the past.
The set of necessary and sufficient conditions for compliance can be written after defining the evolution of the ! parameters through time. There are four cases that must be considered. The case of positive ! and negative Y is provided as an example in the main text; the accounting definitions in the remaining cases are provided below. Notice that the accounting method means that a firm can not carry both credits and debts at the same time, so if any ! is positive (negative) all of the others are weakly positive (negative).
For (! ≥ 0 and Y ≥ 0) or (! < 0 and Y < 0):
For ! < 0 and Y ≥ 0:
After computing the evolution of credits and debts as above, the compliance condition itself can be defined easily. A firm is in compliance with regulation in all years t if and only if:
The firm's full maximization problem over time (without discounting) can then be written as:
where I(Q) = 0 iff (! 0,t > 0 or Y t > "! 0,t for all t) .
The problem for the unconstrained firm reduces to period-by-period profit maximization since the right hand term drops out. For constrained firms, however, the constraint includes multiple discontinuities and the complete history of a firm's actions (since I depends on the entire time series of ! 0 , ! 1 , and ! 2 ). In order to simplify the problem for estimation I define compliance in a single year as Y t ≥ 0. This is a sufficient condition for compliance in the dynamic model, but abstracts from banking and borrowing. If demands are certain and stable over time and assuming convex profits with respect to fleet fuel economy, however, the period-by-period solution to the static problem coincides with the solution to the full dynamic problem above. Marginal cost of a one mile per gallon increment to the standard. 
